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Best available copyAbstract 
Is the recent decline in monetary velocity the result of deregulation or 
disinflation?  Studies of this issue using recent U.S.  data generally 
attribute the decline to deregulation.  We examine the experience in the 
United States back to 1907 and the recent experience, the past 30 years, in a 
group of 39 countries.  Our results show a systematic relation between 
unexpected changes in the money-income  relationship and changes in the trends 
of inflation rates. 
By our calculations,  a policy that reduced average inflation by 10 
percentage points from one business cycle to the next would be associated with 
an average 3 to 5 percentage-point  reduction in  velocity growth trends.  This 
effect is somewhat smaller than the U.S. record for the 1980s,  especially for 
MI.  We do not offer these results as a method for adjusting monetary targets 
during a disinflation; rather,  our results offer further evidence that the 
failure to commit to a stable price policy tends to destabilize the economy. 
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The U.S.  economy in the 1980s saw a decline in the trend growth rate of 
monetary velocity--the  ratio of nominal GNP to the money supply.  This 
unexpected development was reflected in the systematic overprediction of 
inflation and nominal GNP growth by econometric models and economic 
forecasters.  Lucas (1976) showed that econometric models would err when 
simulating policy alternatives or when forecasting over a horizon in which 
policy had changed. 
Was the recent decline in monetary velocity the result of deregulation or 
disinflation?  Studies of this issue have found little effect from the 
disinflation policy.  These studies have focused on U.S. data from 1959 to the 
1980s.  Rasche (1986,  1988) and Roley (1985) find that including inflation or 
inflation expectations as explanatory variables does not pick up the changes 
in velocity that occurred in the early 1980s.  Both authors attribute the 
shift in velocity to deregulation because the shift is explained by dummy 
variables entered for periods of regulatory change.  The problem,  of course, 
is that the disinflation policy and the deregulation occurred over the same 
period. 
Poole (1988) argues that including long-term  interest rates in a standard 
log-linear  money-demand  function tends to capture the effect of changing 
inflation trends.  These equations,  however, also made large errors in 
forecasting  money demand in the 1980s.  But perhaps we should not be convinced 
by the standard regression results.  It does not seem appropriate to use 
short-term  movements in money growth,  inflation, or long-term  interest rates 
http://clevelandfed.org/research/workpaper/index.cfm
Best available copyas a proxy for the disinflation  policy.  Disinflation policies are irregular 
events; indeed,  the entire period for which the Federal Reserve maintains 
consistent data for the monetary aggregates,  1959:Ql to the present, contains 
few episodes that might be accurately portrayed as including a disinflation 
policy. 
In this paper,  we consider the effect of disinflation policies on the 
velocity relationship by examining the experience in the United States back to 
1907 and the recent experience -- the past 30 years -- in a group of 39 
countries.  Our results show a systematic relation between unexpected changes 
in the money-income relationship and changes in the trends of inflation rates. 
By our calculations,  a policy that reduced average inflation by 10 percentage 
points from one business cycle to the next would be associated with an average 
3 to 5 percentage-point  reduction in velocity growth trends.  This effect is 
somewhat smaller than the U.S. record for the 1980s,  especially for MI.  We do 
not offer these results as a method for adjusting monetary targets during a 
disinflation;  rather,  our results offer further evidence that the failure to 
commit to a stable price policy tends to destabilize the economy. 
Why Should Disinflation Policies Lead to Lower Velocity Growth? 
People hold money to reduce transaction costs.  The opportunity cost of 
holding money is the real interest foregone from not holding bonds and the 
depreciation of the value of cash holdings due to inflation.  At the margin, 
people will want to hold more money relative to their income and expenditures 
when the cost of holding money falls.  Therefore,  when inflation declines we 
expect velocity, the ratio of income to money, to fall. 
The dynamics of this process become complex when we introduce 
forward-looking  expectations.  Consider the conventional log-linear 
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Best available copymoney-demand  function.  When we combine this money-demand  model with a 
money-supply  policy and solve for the inflation rate,  we find that inflation 
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today is a function of expected future money growth.  Any discrete change in 
the expected trend in money growth will lead to a discrete change in the level 
of money demand.  So,  while changes in the trend growth rate of the money 
supply lead to equal changes in the trend inflation rate, there will be a 
temporary period of negative correlation  between inflation and money growth 
due to the one-time  shift in money demand 
Assume for simplicity that real income and transaction technologies are 
fixed.  If the central bank had a policy of stable inflation (zero or some 
other constant rate),  the money growth rate would equal the inflation rate 
Expectations of inflation would not change from period to period, and the 
implied velocity trend growth would be zero.  If the central bank had a policy 
of increasing the inflation rate at a constant acceleration rate each period, 
then inflation expectations would be rising at a constant rate,  money growth 
would be less than the inflation rate,  and velocity would grow at a constant 
rate. 
A discrete shift in the level of velocity occurs whenever there is a 
change from one money growth rate to another.  In Figure 1 we illustrate a 
hypothetical economy showing the effect of abrupt changes in the money growth 
trend under the assumption that the public expects the current money growth 
trend to be permanent. 
The period from 0  to T  represents a steady state with zero inflation. The 
1 
money growth rate is zero,  inflation is zero,  and velocity is constant,  as 
shown in the bottom panel of Figure 1.  At T the equilibrium money growth 
1 
rate is raised to 5 percent.  The price level and velocity jump to a new 
level;  inflation rises from 0  to 5 percent,  but velocity growth is still zero. 
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the money growth trend to 10  percent -- and the price level and velocity jump 
again.  At T , an abrupt disinflation policy is adopted.  The money growth 
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trend is lowered to the original level. 
Of course,  it is inappropriate to expect people to be completely surprised 
by current or future changes in the course of policy.  In the real world we 
expect some anticipation  of policy changes and perhaps a period of learning 
after the policy changes are made.  Changes in prices may lead or lag the 
actual implementation of a disinflation policy.  A  longer lag is more likely 
when the monetary authority lacks credibility.  While no one expects the 
economy to behave in the stylistic fashion depicted in Figure 1,  the figure 
captures the essence of a process that we think has been at work in the United 
States since World War 11. 
The Framework for Analyzing the Effects of Disinflation on Velocity 
The velocity relationship has been measured in various ways.  Many people 
have used a leading velocity concept because changes in  money tend to lead 
changes in income.  In this paper we use the following  version of the St. 
2 
Louis equation to define the velocity relation: 
n 
(1)  Vln(GNP),  - c +  1 bj Vln(M),-j  + e,, 
j  =o 
where 
GNP - nominal gross national product, 
M = money stock defined alternatively as the monetary base,  MI, and M2, 
e = error term,  where e,-iid  N(0  ,a2). 
We examine the out-of-sample  forecast errors from this equation and their 
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of the velocity process implied by the St. Louis equation: 
n 
(2)  Vv,  =  -  Vln(M),  + c +  1  bj Vln(M),-j  + e,, 
j=O 
where v,  =  ln(GNP/M),  . 
This equation implies that the velocity growth trend is equal to a 
constant plus a proportion (lbj-1)  of the money growth trend.  This 
equation can  work well in a wide variety of economic structures as long as the 
process generating the money supply is well-behaved. If there are no abrupt 
changes in the trend of money growth, then a weighted sum of past money growth 
may be a good predictor of future money growth.  However,  this equation will 
err when used to predict nominal GNP growth in the presence of a change in 
policy.  The error will be largest in the near term and will gradually 
disappear as the forecast horizon is lengthened. 
One implication of this finding is that an empirical researcher estimating 
the St. Louis equation -- or some other simple expression of the quantity 
theory -- will want to choose a time period that excludes abrupt changes in 
the trend money-growth  rate.  Periods of abrupt policy changes will be avoided 
because they include the transitory periods when prices and money will not be 
moving together.  For example,  we find that most studies of the St. Louis 
equation omit the Korean War experience.  One might think of the U.S. 
experience from 1955 to the present as being depicted in Figure 1.  Between 
1955 and 1980,  the trend of inflation and money growth steadily increased (as 
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of inflation was reversed. 
Of course,  the illustration is not exact.  Rather than a decline in the 
price level,  there was a jump in the money supply (spread over several years). 
Nevertheless, the effect on velocity is the same (see the bottom panel of 
Figure 1).  The jump in the money supply should be expected because the 
Federal Reserve does not have ultimate goals for the money stock.  Rather, 
goals are formulated in terms of prices and income.  Monetary targets are used 
as intermediate targets to achieve those goals.  If the public and the Federal 
Reserve expect a one-time  increase in real money demand following the 
implementation of a disinflation policy, then the Fed would be expected to 
accommodate this demand shift with an equal shift in the money supply in order 
to maintain a given path for income and prices.  In  practice,  because the Fed 
uses the federal funds rate as an operating instrument, the Fed tends to 
accommodate shifts in nominal money demand automatically. 
Therefore,  the expectation that there will be a reduction in the monetary 
growth trend over the long run  will be accompanied by a decline in the 
inflation rate and a temporary increase in the observed money stock.  Ideally, 
we would like to measure the excess of money supply over real money demand. In 
the absence of a  well-defined  measure of real money demand,  we use the average 
inflation rate over an extended period as a measure of the expected trend in 
money supply growth. 
Experience in the United States: 1907 to 1987 
We use historical data for money and nominal income starting in 1907:Q3 to 
examine the forecasting error of the St. Louis equation.  We want to see 
whether equation (1)  systematically overpredicted nominal GNP growth in 
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underpredicted nominal GNP growth when there was an increase in the trend 
inflation rate.  Under the assumptions implied by  this equation,  there should 
be no systematic correlation between the forecast errors and the change in the 
average inflation rates.  We examined this proposition under three alternative 
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definitions of money:  the monetary base,  MI, and M2.  Equation (1) was 
estimated for a series of samples that included three consecutive business 
cycles as measured from trough to trough.  Equations estimated separately for 
each aggregate in each sample were used to forecast nominal GNP growth in the 
next cycle. 
We began by estimating this model for the period 1908:Q4  to 1919:Ql.  Each 
estimated equation was then used with actual monetary data to predict nominal 
GNP growth over the course of the next business cycle.  The equations were 
updated seriatim by adding the data from the forecast cycle and dropping the 
data from the first cycle.  This procedure was followed through the last 
forecast interval,  1983:Ql to 1987:Q1,  which is not a full cycle.  Overall, 
there are 15 forecast intervals for the base and M2.  There are only 13 
forecast intervals for M1 because of the lack of quarterly information about 
the split between demand and time deposits before 1914:Q3. 
The first three columns in Table 1 list the estimated standard errors for 
each aggregate in each of the overlapping estimation periods.  The standard 
regression errors for all equations reflect the pattern of variance in GNP 
growth.  There was a large decline in the variance of GNP growth and in the 
standard error of the forecasting equations after W  11.  Averages for the 
entire sample,  for the periods before 1946,  and for the periods after 1946 are 
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Best available copyshown at the bottom of each table.  M2 has the lowest standard error on 
average for the entire sample,  and M1 has the lowest standard error in the 
postwar era. 
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Adjusted R-squares  are also reported in Table 1.  M1 yields the most 
consistent in-sample  explanation of nominal GNP growth.  The results for the 
other aggregates vary over time.  The monetary base never explains much of the 
in-sample  variation of nominal GNP growth. 
The out-of-sample  statistics (shown in Table 2)  should confirm the results 
of the in-sample  statistics if the forecasting model is stable over time.  The 
root mean square errors (RMSEs) reflect a common problem in economic 
forecasting.  The specification that works best in any particular sample does 
not always work best in the next period.  In our case,  M1 had the most 
explanatory power in-sample,  but M2 produced the best out-of-sample  forecasts. 
If we consider only the subsample for which M1 quarterly data were available, 
the RMSEs for M2 were lowest on average.  The average for M2 is 9.15  percent 
at annual rates for the periods from 1924 to 1987.  M1 did better than M2 in 
the 1950s and the 1970s.  M1 has done so poorly in the 1980s that it does 
worse on average than the monetary base over the entire postwar period,  even 
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though it performed better than the base for the 30 years before 1980. 
While the absolute size of variation in velocity was much higher before 
WWII, the perception that there was a large increase in uncertainty about 
velocity in the 1980s is due to the relative increase in the forecast errors. 
There were only two business cycles in which one could uniformly reject the 
hypothesis that forecast errors (for all definitions of velocity) were 
generated by the same model used to make the forecast: the cycles from 1933:Q2 
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variable in some earlier periods, the relative uncertainty about quarterly 
movements in velocity was as high in the early 1980s as it has ever been. 
Cycle-average  forecast errors are shown on the right side of Table 2. 
There were very large average forecast errors before 1946,  although these 
errors were not large relative to the standard error of the forecasting 
equations.  The forecasts were relatively unbiased after 1946 except in the 
1946-1949  business cycle and in the most recent period (1983-1987).  The large 
bias in the forecast using M1 in the most recent cycle is one source of 
current disenchantment  with monetary targeting.  Tests show several 
significant errors in the forecast of the velocity growth trend scattered 
throughout the 80-year  period.  In recent years we see that there was a 
significant underprediction of the GNP growth trend for all of the aggregates 
for the period 1975:Q2 to 1980:Q3.  This was followed by significant 
overprediction of GNP growth trends in the 1980s. 
To what extent are these large errors associated with changes in monetary 
policy?  To answer this question,  we regressed the mean forecast error on the 
change in the average inflation rate for the most recent cycle in the 
estimation period to the average in the forecast cycle.  Under the hypothesis 
of our regression model, the mean forecast error is distributed normally with 
zero mean and variance equal to the estimated variance of the error in the 
regression equation divided by the square root of the number of quarters in 
the forecast interval. 
We assume that the expected variances of the forecast errors for each 
cycle are equal to the estimated variance of the error in the forecasting 
equations.  Since these expected variances differ so much over the past 80 
years,  we cannot assume that the errors will be homoscedastic.  While an 
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variables will result in unbiased estimates of the slope parameters, it may 
yield inefficient estimates of the variances of the parameter estimates and 
incorrect t-statistics. To avoid this problem, we weighted the mean forecast 
errors and the right-hand-side  variables by the reciprocal of the expected 
standard deviation of the mean forecast error and then used OLS on the 
weighted variables. 
Results in Table 3 show that changes in the inflation trend were 
positively related to the cycle-average  forecast error.  As expected,  a 
disinflation policy raised the demand for real balances and lowered the 
velocity growth rate. 
Cross-Country  Evidence: 1957 to 1985 
Further evidence is presented from a cross-sectional  study of 39 
countries.  For each country,  we compare the out-of-sample  forecasting errors 
of equation (1) in the 1980s to the change in the expected money-supply-growth 
trend.  As was the case for the United States,  we find that the St. Louis 
equation systematically overpredicts nominal GNP growth following a reduction 
in the expected money-supply-growth  trend and systematically underpredicts 
nominal GNP growth following an increase in the expected money-supply-growth 
trend. 
The cross-country  data come from the International Financial Statistics 
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tape compiled by the International  Monetary Fund.  Because quarterly GNP data 
are relatively scarce,  we have used annual data through 1979 to estimate the 
country models.  The equation included the contemporaneous value and a 
one-year  lag of MI growth.  We used quarterly Consumer Price Index (CPI) data, 
however, to measure inflation trends in each of the countries.  In general, 
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less-developed  countries.  It seems that the CPI is one of the most carefully 
constructed economic indexes.  By using the CPI to measure the change in the 
inflation trend,  we reduce the possibility that our results are due to 
measurement error in the construction of the GNP deflator. 
Our forecasting equation should underpredict GNP  growth for those 
countries that have had an increase in the inflation trend and should 
overpredict  GNP  growth for those countries that have had a decline in the 
inflation trend.  Table 4  lists the countries included in the sample and the 
beginning and end of the sample data for each country.  Also listed are the 
summary statistics for each country used in the forecasting experiment.  In 
order,  we list unadjusted R-squared  for the forecasting equation estimated 
through 1979,  the mean forecast error for the 1980s,  and the change in the 
inflation trend (measured as the average quarterly growth rate of the CPI in 
the 1980s minus the quarterly average growth rate from 1973:Q2 through 
1979:Q4).  Twenty-two  of the countries had lower inflation trends in the early 
1980s than they had in the 1970s,  and seventeen had higher trends.  The 
correlation between forecast errors and the change in the inflation trend is 
shown in Table 5.  We regress the mean forecast errors for each country on the 
change in the inflation trend.  The errors of the St. Louis model are clearly 
correlated with the change in the inflation trends. 
Chart 1 shows the scatter diagram of the average forecast error for each 
country plotted against the change in the inflation trend.  Four outliers have 
very high inflation rates and very large changes in the inflation trend: 
Bolivia,  Brazil, Mexico,  and Peru.  We reproduce the regression results 
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conclusions for countries with small to moderate changes in inflation as well 
as countries that end hyperinflations. 
Conc  lus  ion 
Evidence from 80 years of U.S.  experience and a 30-year  cross-section  of 
39 countries shows that the velocity relation embodied in the St. Louis 
equation was systematically affected by disinflation (and inflation) policies. 
Velocity typically declines relative to trend when disinflation policies are 
adopted.  This result is predicted by traditional money-demand  theory with 
forward-looking  expectations. 
For the experience covered by our data,  a policy that reduced average 
inflation  by 10  percent from one business cycle to the next would be 
associated with an average 3 to 5 percent reduction in velocity growth trends. 
While a disinflation  policy is expected to lead to a decline in the velocity 
growth trend,  the size and timing of the decline error are still uncertain. 
This is partly because the parameters of the forecasting equation are likely 
to change with a policy shift,  and partly because central banks do not commit 
to long-run  monetary trends.  Even if we knew  how the forecasting model would 
err in the presence of a policy regime shift,  we could not predict inflation 
with confidence  because we cannot predict future money-supply  trends. 
One might conclude from our analysis that the Federal Reserve should use 
nominal GNP or the price level itself as the guide to policy.  As in Haraf 
(1986),  the occurrence of persistent deviations of velocity from trend implies 
that simple money-growth  rules may not be the best way to reduce inflation 
gradually.  Nevertheless, we do not think this is the most important point to 
be made.  Rather, our results show that uncertainty about future policies can 
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were able to commit to a long-run  nominal GNP or price level target:  the 
short-run  variability in velocity and money growth could then be safely 
ignored.  Otherwise, the public is left with the difficult task of predicting 
the future  behavior of policymakers. 
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1.  See Cagan (1956), Friedman (1969), and Sargent (1986) for further 
discussions of this model of money demand. 
2.  This equation is in the tradition of the St. Louis equation that was 
introduced by Andersen and Jordan (1968). 
3.  The data used in this study come from a variety of sources.  M1 and M2: 
May 1907 to December 1958 from Friedman and Schwartz (1963); and January 
1959 to March 1987 from the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve 
System.  Values for MI were semiannual until June 1914.  Monetary base: 
May 1907 to December 1918 from Friedman and Schwartz (1963);  and January 
1919 to March 1987 from the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis,  adjusted 
for changes in reserve requirements,  but not seasonally adjusted.  The 
Census X-11  program in SAS was used to seasonally adjust this monthly 
series,  which was then used to get quarterly averages.  Data series from 
different sources that were used in statistical analysis were spliced by 
transforming the early series to growth rates and computing revised level 
series based on the actual level of the most recent series.  Commercial 
paper rate:  Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System.  The early 
values for this interest rate are published in Banking and Monetary 
Statistics,  and recent values are published in the Federal Reserve 
Bulletin.  Quarterly data were computed as the average of monthly values. 
GNP and GNP deflator:  1907:Q2  to 1947:Q4  from Gordon (1982);  and 1948:Q4 
to 1987:Ql  from the Bureau of Economic Activity. 
4. While the explanatory power of this forecasting model is quite low in an 
absolute sense,  there was not a significant amount of serial correlation 
in the error term for the cases before 1927 or after 1950.  While this is 
a very naive forecasting model, it does about as well in recent years as 
more elaborate models.  For example,  Karamouzis and Lombra (1988) report 
that the RMSE of the Federal Reserve staff's quarterly nominal GNP 
forecast was 4.2  percent at an annual rate for the period between 1973:Ql 
and 1982:Q4.  This is somewhat greater than the RMSEs from the M1 
equation,  but about the same as the RMSEs for the other aggregates during 
this period. 
5.  The relatively poor performance of M1 is probably due to the relaxation of 
the prohibition against paying interest on checkable accounts.  See Rasche 
(1988) for an argument that all of the increase in uncertainty about 
velocity is due to deregulation.  Using MIA in place of MI in the 1980s 
does not help overall.  The error using MIA was very large in the 1980:Q4 
to 1982:Q4  cycle and offsets some improvement in the recent cycle.  For a 
discussion of MIA and its usefulness as an indicator and target of policy, 
see Darby,  Mascaro, and Marlow (1987) and Gavin and Pakko (1987). 
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Best available copy6. We started with the 46 countries included in the study by Kormendi and 
Meguire (1984).  Our data come from a more recent tape supplied by the 
International  Monetary Fund (IMF).  Taiwan was eliminated from the tape by 
the IMF.  We eliminated six other countries that had less than 21 annual 
observations so that we were left with 39 countries in our data set. 
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Best available copyTable 1. In-Sample  Statistics 
Estimated Standard Errors  Adjusted R-  Squares 
Estimation ...............................  ............................ 
Period  Base  M1  M2  Base  MI  M2 
08:4-19:l  12.97  12.16  0.17  0.27 
12:2-21:3  16.58  15.83  0.28  0.34 
15:l-24:3  17.74  17.02  17.61  0.25  0.31  0.26 
19:2-27:4  15.37  13.92  13.47  0.20  0.34  0.39 
21:4-33:l  17.82  12.51  11.41  -0.01  0.50  0.59 
24:4-38:2  20.50  17.96  15.63  0.05  0.27  0.45 
28:  1-45:4  21.54  18.04  17.40  0.00  0.30  0.35 
33:2-49:4  16.93  16.28  15.75  -0.01  0.07  0.13 
38:3-54:2  12.37  10.79  11.67  0.00  0.24  0.11 
46:l-58:2  7.14  5.87  6.69  -0.03  0.30  0.10 
5O:l-61:l  6.46  5.38  6.59  0.00  0.31  -0.04 
54:3-70:4  3.95  3.33  3.65  0.03  0.31  0.17 
58:3-75:l  3.69  3.28  3.48  0.08  0.27  0.18 
61:2-80:3  3.56  3.22  3.52  0.13  0.29  0.15 
71:l-82:4  4.44  4.30  4.64  0.11  0.16  0.03 
..........................................  ............................... 
Average  6.00  12.07  10.15  0.08  0.28  0.23 
Pre  - 1946  17.50  15.89  14.79  0.13  0.35  0.38 
Postwar  4.88  4.23  4.76  0.05  0.28  0.10 
Source:  Authors. 
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Best available copyTable 2. Out-of-Sample  Statistics 
Root Mean Square Errors  Cycle-Average  Forecast Errors 
Forecast .................................  ............................... 
Horizon  Base  M1  M2  Base  MI  M2 
..........................................  ............................... 
Average  12.30  9.77  10.33  0.20  -1.03  -0.33 
Pre  - 1946  22.08  17.74  17.34  0.86  -3.13  -0.09 
Postwar  5.78  6.22  5.66  -0.24  -0.09  -0.50 
* Indicates that the root mean square error is significantly greater 
than the estimated standard error of the forecast equation or the 
forecast error is different from zero at the 5 percent critical level. 
#  Indicates that the root mean square error is significantly greater 
than the estimated standard error of the forecast equation or the 
forecast error is different from zero at the 10  percent critical level. 
Source:  Authors. 
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Best available copyTable 3.  Average Forecast Errors and Changes in Economic Trends 
(United States Experience) 
......................................................................... 
St. Louis Base  M1  M2 
......................................................................... 
Constant  -0.07  (-0.04)  -.Ol  (-0.52)  0.13  (-0.11) 
Change in average 
inflationrate  0.72  (2.88)  0.49  (1.97)  0.39  (2.62) 
R Squared  0.39  0.26  0.35 
No. of Obs.  15  13  15 
Degrees of Freedom  13  11  13 
......................................................................... 
Note: Weighted least squares were used to calculate the statistics in Table 
"T" statistics are shown in parentheses. 
Source:  Authors. 
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Best available copyTable 4.  The Cross-Country  Sample 
Sample  Unadjusted  Average Forecast  Change in 










































Source:  Authors. 
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Best available copyTable 5.  Average Forecast Errors and Changes in Economic Trends 
(Foreign Experience Using MI) 
........................................................................ 
39 countries  Excluding Outliers 
........................................................................ 
Constant  0.81  0.58 
Change in average 
inflation rate  0.26  (9.04) 
R Squared  0.69  0.15 
No. of Obs.  39  35 
Degrees of Freedom  3  7  3  3 
Note:  "T" statistics are shown in parentheses. 
Source:  Authors. 
http://clevelandfed.org/research/workpaper/index.cfm
Best available copyChart  1.  Average Forecast Errors  and 
Changes  in Average  Inflation 
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